While India still maintains and
conveys its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China, there has definitely been a “pro-west tilt” in New Delhi’s policy stance in recent years, an Australian academic has told Sputnik India.
The academic, who regularly publishes research papers on Indo-Pacific, reckoned that a “significant shift in India’s foreign policy” has taken place in recent years.
Jain said that the shift in Indian foreign policy started to take place after the Galwan Valley clashes in June 2020. The deadly episode resulted in deaths of 20 Indian and five Chinese soldiers, according to official figures.
Indian foreign minister S Jaishankar has said that the incident “profoundly disturbed trust” between the two neighbours and that it can’t be “business as usual” with Beijing
till the Ladakh border dispute is resolved.
The expert said that before the Galwan Valley clashes, New Delhi harboured reservations about admitting the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in the Malabar drills because of Canberra’s unilateral decision to pull out of Quad in 2008. “So, it is very clear that the China factor has triggered India’s tilt towards the west,” stated Jain.
Jain said that Beijing’s relations with both Australia and Japan have also changed since 2020, which was a factor in driving closer military cooperation between New Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo.
Jain noted that
Japan's 'White Paper' on Defense released last month described China as "an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge", while
Australia's 'Defense Spending Review' this year expressed concerns about the
"major strategic power competition" in Indo-Pacific.
The Australian government document also acknowledged that the US was no longer the "unipolar leader" of the Indo-Pacific.
While Japan as maritime disputes with China in the East China Sea, bilateral ties between China and Australia also went through a turbulent phase after former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent probe into Covid in 2020 and later announced the AUKUS trilateral pact with US and the UK in September 2021.
He, however, labelled China as the “unsaid factor” driving closer cooperation.
“One has to read between the lines… I would argue that although these drills are officially not anti-China per se, but the level and scale of these exercises has been upgraded in recent years due to concerns arising from China,” remarked Jain.
He noted that the "level and scale" of four navies' participation in the drills has been rising over the last few years.
"The Malabar exercises are one of the biggest naval drills to have taken place in the region with the involvement of the four leading powers of the region… These exercises are being certainly held with the motive of enhancing military coordination among the four countries. The type of naval assets which the other three countries have brought to Sydney Harbour shows an enhanced level of participation on part of all the countries taking part in these drills," the Australian academic said.
Jain also argued that the "increased engagements" within the Quad framework had also started to take place after the 2020 Sino-India clashes at the Galwan Valley.
The Quad leaders held the first in-person summit at the White House in 2021, and another leaders' meeting was held in Tokyo last year. This year, the leaders of Australia, Japan, India and the US convened for the second time for the Quad summit, which took place on the fringes of the G-7 Summit in Hiroshima.
While arguing that New Delhi was tilting towards the west in recent years, Jain noted that India’s position on the conflict in Ukraine was very much different from Japan and Australia, other participants in Malabar drills and the Quad partners.
New Delhi has
refused to buckle under western pressure to vote against its “time-tested friend” Russia at the United Nations (UN) in the wake of the special military operation. Unlike India, both Tokyo and Canberra are treaty allies of the US.
“India still relies heavily on Russian arms. According to estimates, Russian arms constitute 60 to 80 constitute 60 to 80 percent of India’s military arsenal, which is a huge figure. We have seen India has been trying to diversify sources of arms in recent years,” the Australian expert said.
Military imports from Russia met almost half of New Delhi’s overall defense needs in 2017-21 period, according to Swedish think tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Defense ties form a crucial pillar of bilateral relations between New Delhi and Moscow.
Significantly, Moscow has also emerged as
India’s top supplier of crude this year, with bilateral trade topping a record of $45 billion in 2022-23 on account of booming Russian energy exports to India.