Russia Well Prepared for NATO F-16s in Ukraine
© AP Photo / AIJAZ RAHI
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The planned deployment of F-16s in Ukraine, which the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced will occur this summer, poses serious challenges to Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO). However, the country is well prepared for the induction with improved tactics and upgraded weapon systems.
The F-16 is as much of a threat as a Soviet era Ukrainian MiG-29, probably even less so. However, there are several reasons why Russia cannot dismiss the threat posed by the NATO mainstay fighter.
When F-16s deploy in Ukrainian battlespace they will be networked with ground and airborne radars as well as other ISR aircraft and drones. The networking will provide Ukrainian pilots unprecedented situational awareness. The aircraft will be carrying long range air-to-air missiles and long range air-to-surface weapons, continuously updated with precise targeting information over data links.
Under the circumstances, the ability of F-16s based in Ukraine to interdict Russian logistic supplies and troop movements cannot be doubted. Neither can their ability to strike targets deep within Russia using long range cruise missiles such as the Anglo-French Storm Shadow/Scalp.
Russian AD has had a fair amount of success in shooting down Storm Shadow missiles in Crimea because of the dense deployment of various types of the systems in the region.
Network Centric Operations
Operating in a network centric environment with high degree of situational awareness, armed with long range dynamically targeted missiles and glide bombs, Ukrainian fighter pilots will be more than a match for Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) fighter pilots - provided Ukrainian F-16 pilots are as experienced as RuAF Su-30SM, Su-30SM2, Su-35 and Su-57 pilots.
The fact is a network centric environment and high situational awareness can often lead to information overload and confusion, if pilots are not experienced and disciplined. Or, if they are not strictly adhering to tactics developed over years at combat training institutions.
Tactics are specific to the operating environment. Ukrainian pilots would not be able to blindly embrace NATO tactics. They would need to develop and refine their tactics over the years based on combat experience.
It's possible, even likely that the F-16s based in Ukraine, are flown by ex-NATO mercenary pilots. There have been reports that the US may allow private military companies (PMCs) to deploy to Ukraine. If experienced NATO F-16 pilots on the rolls of a PMC are flying the F-16s based in Ukraine, the threat from F-16s would be compounded.
Finally, the most troubling aspect of the F-16 threat could well be the unlimited availability of the fighter aircraft and experienced pilots.
Russian Options
NATO F-16s (Note, I don't refer to them as Ukrainian F-16s) deployed in Ukraine could turn the tables, but only if the RuAF didn't have better aircraft, better weapons and more experienced pilots.
Here it is worth noting that RuAF pilots are unarguably the most experienced combat pilots in the world today. They fly very capable and well armed fighters that have been tweaked and honed through combat experience. Russian air defence (AD) systems, once again combat proven, are acknowledged as the best in the world. Most importantly, RuAF pilots would be fighting for their fatherland, unlike F-16 mercenary pilots.
Exploiting Critical F-16 Weaknesses
The F-16 has two critical weaknesses:
1. Limited range
2. Need for sophisticated support facilities, including well prepared runways.
Russian forces will exploit these weaknesses to the hilt. Russia will ensure that NATO F-16s are based as far away from the battlefront as possible. Such bases will limit the ability of the F-16s to penetrate into Russian territory for deep strikes.
Because of the threat from Russian ballistic and cruise missiles, it's likely that NATO F-16s will operate from Ukrainian air bases that have hardened shelters, in central or Western Ukraine. Starokonstantinov airbase in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, which hosts Su-24 upgraded to launch Storm Shadow missiles, could be the home base.
Russian forces have repeatedly attacked the airbase but it continues to remain in use.
The aircraft could also be based at Dubno airbase in the Rovno region, West Ukraine. The airfield at Dubno is a military facility. It's likely that the airfield is used for shipment of weapons to Ukraine by air. It's out of range of Russian missiles like Iskander-M and Kinzhal.
The F-16s inability to deploy from under prepared runways or roads rule out attacks through surreptitious deployment of the fighters closer to the battle front.
Likely Russian Tactics
Due to the possible F-16 threat to Russian forces, the Russian tactics would pivot around attacking the NATO fighters.
Knowing as much, it's likely that Ukrainian forces will deploy their most advanced AD systems - Patriots, NASAMS - around F-16 operating bases. In turn, Russia will relentlessly target these AD units using drones, cruise missiles and precision strike ballistic missiles.
During the first two years of the SMO, Russia was able to establish air superiority along the battlefront only, using fighters armed with long range air-to-air missiles for air combat and anti-radiation missiles for suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD). The airspace over most of Ukraine remained heavily contested due to the presence of a large number of Soviet era and Western AD systems in the inventory of Ukrainian forces.
Lately, however, Russian forces have been able to establish air superiority deeper into Ukrainian airspace through relentless attacks on Ukrainian AD systems. Russian reconnaissance drones have reportedly remained on patrol over Odessa and in the Poltava region non stop for hours.
There is also evidence that AD has been significantly degraded in almost the entire Ukrainian airspace. For example, during collective strikes, Russian cruise missiles and drones are now tracking less circuitous flight paths to their targets than in the past.
The degradation of Ukrainian AD is not surprising. Since the start of the SMO, Ukraine has lost most of its Soviet era AD systems. While it's possible for Ukraine to replace its Western supplied AD systems, there is no way for it to replace its Soviet era systems. As the density of the operational AD system reduces, it will become easier and easier for Russian forces to further degrade Ukrainian AD.
Use of Long Range Stealth Drone for SEAD
On July 2, Russia struck Ukraine's Mirgorod airbase in the Poltava region for the second time on consecutive days.
As on the day earlier, a reconnaissance UAV was used to obtain targeting information and capture footage for post strike damage assessment.
Mirgorod is 150 km from the line of control. The video footage appears to have been taken by a UAV positioned NE of the base (R/W orientation 04/22) with the camera lens tilted 45-deg or more from the vertical towards Ukrainian controlled territory.
Assuming an operating height of 30,000 ft the camera was looking around 35 km into adversary controlled territory. That would place the UAV around 115 km inside adversary airspace. The question arises - Why didn't Ukrainian AD engage the drone on both days.
It's likely that the Russian UAV deployed has excellent RF, visual and audio stealth characteristics. The flying-wing drone Albatros M5 is one such UAV. The reconnaissance UAV equipped with electro optical sensors transmits data and video imagery in real time to direct aircraft and artillery at ground targets.
More importantly, the Albatros, which has sensors to locate adversary AD systems, can also act as bait to draw adversary AD fire. An adversary AD unit attempting to bring down the UAV would immediately draw retaliatory action.
Staging Bases
Russia is likely to leverage the degradation of Ukrainian AD and its ability to mount a 24/7 vigil using long range stealth drones to preclude use of staging bases by NATO F-16s based in Ukraine. If F-16s land at a staging base to refuel or arm, it is likely they will come under immediate attack by Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles with sniper-like accuracy.
Attacking F-16 Home Bases
As mentioned earlier, NATO F-16s operating out of Ukraine will likely be based and serviced in hardened or underground shelters. In order to neutralise them on the ground, Russia would need good intelligence. While a direct hit on a hardened shelter with an Iskander-M or Kinzhal with the right warhead would destroy the aircraft in the shelter, the challenge would be to know which shelter has an aircraft in it.
Russian forces could also disrupt F-16 operations by disabling the home base runway, to prevent recovery of aircraft returning from a mission, forcing the returning aircraft to divert to an airbase where they would be more vulnerable. Once again such disruption and subsequent attack would require excellent intelligence.
Another approach would be to attack the supporting infrastructure for F-16 operations - air and ground crew, servicing bays, fuel and ammunition storage facilities. Intelligence for such attacks would be less challenging to obtain.
Longer Range Precision Strike Missiles
For strikes on F-16 operating bases, wherever they may be in Ukraine, Russia would need longer range, non interceptable, precision strike missiles than those currently available. Perhaps longer range Iskander-M, Ground launched Zircon or intermediate range Rubez.
The only reason why Russia currently doesn't have longer range precision strike missiles is because its missiles needed to conform to INF treaty obligation. The technical challenge in increasing range is likely very limited.
Conclusion
The deployment of NATO F-16s in Ukraine is likely the most serious threat faced by Russia so far on account of US / NATO weapon supplies to Ukraine. The deployment is a serious escalation. However, Russia has the technical means and will to mitigate the threat to an extent where it cannot affect the eventual outcome of the SMO.
